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519 
United States v. Carloss: Should the Police Act like Good 
Neighbors? 
I. Introduction 
It is almost universally agreed that, in a functioning and cohesive society, 
maintaining positive and healthy relationships with one’s neighbors is 
paramount.
1
 But what does “being a good neighbor” actually mean? As 
most would understand it, neighborly behavior could include greeting and 
waving, having the occasional chat, maintaining the home’s exterior, and 
keeping noises and disturbances to a minimum and confined to particular 
times. While these actions are certainly “neighborly,” maybe the most 
important way to maintain good relations with one’s neighbor is by 
respecting his or her privacy and property. Indeed, as Robert Frost once 
quipped, “Good fences make good neighbors.”2 But, what happens when 
you need to speak to your neighbor? Should you be allowed to approach 
their home to knock and speak with them? If your neighbor doesn’t answer 
the door immediately, how long can you wait for an answer before leaving? 
While the answers to these questions have day-to-day societal implications, 
they likewise have significant legal consequences, particularly in the law 
enforcement context. The answers to these questions set the constitutional 
boundaries for proper police procedure—limits which, at times, may 
conflict with the necessary investigatory powers granted to law 
enforcement in order to protect and serve society. 
The Tenth Circuit grappled with these issues and questions in its recent 
decision in United States v. Carloss.
3
 In the case, the court was asked to 
determine whether a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated as 
a result of a police “knock and talk” encounter at his residence.4 
                                                                                                                 
 1. For example, the Emily Post Institute, founded by the eponymous writer famous for 
her articles and books on etiquette, devotes a section of its website to neighborly manners. 
See Living with Neighbors, EMILY POST INST. (June 4, 2017, 10:04 PM), http://emilypost. 
com/advice-type/living-with-neighbors/. 
 2. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED 
POEMS, COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 33, 33 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1979). Ironically, 
users of this oft-quoted line may well be distorting the deeper meaning of Frost’s poem. (The 
author of this Note recognizes that he is now guilty of this very thing as well). But, 
discussing the true meaning of the twentieth-century poem, regardless of the elegance of 
Frost’s words, is not the crux of this Note and seems best saved for another time and place.  
 3. 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016).  
 4. Id. at 990. A “knock and talk,” discussed in greater detail below, is essentially “a 
procedure used by law enforcement officers, under which they approach the door of a 
residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants, typically to obtain more information regarding 
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Specifically, the court addressed: (1) whether the posted “No Trespassing” 
signs on the residential property where the defendant was living revoked 
the implied license to approach the home and knock on the front door; and 
(2) whether law enforcement agents lingered too long on the front porch of 
the residence, thereby exceeding the implied license to come briefly onto 
the “curtilage”5 of the home.6 
The Tenth Circuit decided the first issue in Carloss using a fairly novel 
approach, but, in doing so, effectively muddied existing case law and failed 
to properly apply its own rule. And, when faced with the novel legal 
question embodied in the second issue, the court failed to create an 
ascertainable framework for addressing the issue in future cases. Thus, this 
Note will cover: in Part II, a brief summary of Carloss; in Part III, the state 
of the law regarding the pertinent legal issues prior to Carloss; in Part IV, 
the relevant analysis and holdings of the Tenth Circuit; in Part V, a 
discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s Carloss analysis, potential problems with 
its ruling, and suggested solutions for the issues raised in Carloss moving 
forward; and in Part VI, a brief conclusion. 
II. Summary of United States v. Carloss 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In Carloss, an agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF) received several tips that Ralph Carloss, a convicted felon, was 
unlawfully in possession of a firearm and was selling methamphetamine out 
                                                                                                                 
a criminal investigation or to obtain consent to search where probable cause is lacking.” Fern 
L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and Talk 
Visits Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515 (2006). 
 5. Justice Scalia defined “curtilage” as “the area ‘immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home.’” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)). In Oliver, Justice Powell explained that the concept of 
the “curtilage” has its roots in common law and warrants the same “Fourth Amendment 
protections that attach to the home.” 466 U.S. at 180. Interestingly, another court noted that 
the early definition of “curtilage” included “any building or structure within a bowshot of the 
manor house” but that the modern view on curtilage is not one of “proximity” but one of 
“intimacy, personal autonomy, and privacy” that are “associated with the home.” United 
States v. Rogers, No. CRIM.03-10313-RGS, 2005 WL 478001, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 
2005).  
 6. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 990. The Tenth Circuit additionally addressed whether the 
district court erred in finding that Carloss consented to the police officers entering the home, 
ultimately concluding that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Carloss 
consented to the officers entering his home. Id. at 998. However, because this issue is not the 
focus of this Note, it will not be discussed further.  
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of a home Carloss shared with another person.
7
 Based on these tips, the 
ATF agent, accompanied by an investigator from the local police 
department, traveled to Carloss’s residence one afternoon to investigate.8 In 
the front and side yards and on the front door of the residence, four “No 
Trespassing” signs were posted.9 Specifically, there was a “No 
Trespassing” sign “on an approximately three-foot-high wooden post 
located beside the driveway, on the side farthest from the house,” another 
“tacked to a tree in the side yard,” a third “on a wooden pole in the front 
yard along the side of the driveway closest to the house,” and a fourth “on 
the front door of the house.”10 Although the officers parked in the driveway 
and walked to the front door, the officers testified that they failed to notice 
any of the signs on the day in question.
11
 The district court noted, however, 
that the signs were indeed present but that no fence or other means of 
enclosure of any sort surrounded the home.
12
 
Approaching the home to speak with Carloss, the officers knocked on the 
door for “several minutes,” but no one answered.13 The officers did, 
however, testify to hearing movement inside the house.
14
 “A short time 
later,” Heather Wilson, an occupant of the house during the police visit, 
exited the rear of the house and began speaking with the officers in the 
home’s side yard.15 At this point, Carloss also exited via the back door to 
speak with the officers in the side yard; at no point, however, did Wilson or 
Carloss refer to the “No Trespassing” signs, nor did they ask the officers to 
leave.
16
 When the officers requested to search the home, Carloss informed 
them that he would have to ask the owner, identified as Earnest Dry, the 
home’s other resident.17 As Carloss began to enter the house to discuss the 
situation with Dry, the officers “asked if they could go in with Carloss,” to 
which Carloss replied “sure.”18 Carloss and the officers then entered the 
back door and crossed a “mud” or storage room before entering Carloss’s 
room; in Carloss’s room, officers identified “drug paraphernalia and a white 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. at 990-91.  
 8. Id. at 990.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 990-91.  
 16. Id. at 991. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
522 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:519 
 
 
powder residue that appeared to be methamphetamine.”19 Dry and a third 
person, Katy Homberger, entered Carloss’s room.20 Dry then phoned his 
attorney; when informed that the officers did not have a search warrant, Dry 
told the officers that they did not have permission to search the house and 
asked them to leave.
21
 
The officers then left the home and subsequently applied for—and were 
granted—a search warrant based on the evidence seen in Carloss’s room.22 
Upon returning with the warrant, the officers discovered multiple 
methamphetamine labs, lab components, a loaded shotgun, two blasting 
caps, ammunition, and other drug paraphernalia.
23
 After unsuccessfully 
moving to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, Carloss 
entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of conspiring to possess 
pseudoephedrine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress to the Tenth Circuit.
24
 
B. Issues and Holdings 
Pertinent to this Note, the Tenth Circuit identified two issues raised by 
Carloss on appeal.
25
 First, Carloss argued that the presence of the “No 
Trespassing” signs on the property revoked law enforcement’s customary 
implied license to approach the home to conduct a knock and talk.
26
 
Second, Carloss argued that, even if the implied license was not revoked by 
the “No Trespassing” signs, the officers nonetheless exceeded the implied 
license by remaining on the front porch for too long.
27
 
On the first issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that “the officers did not 
conduct a search when they went onto the front porch to knock on Carloss’s 
front door,” because the officers enjoyed an implied license “to go onto the 
curtilage of Carloss’s home in order to knock on the front door” and the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. As noted supra note 6, a third issue, whether Carloss gave “free and voluntary 
consent to entry,” is not discussed in this Note. See Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 
11, United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 13-7082), 2014 WL 
580562, at *7. 
 26. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 994. This is important because, if the “No Trespassing” signs 
revoked the implied license to approach the home, the conduct of the officers would have 
amounted to an unconstitutional, warrantless search.  
 27. Id. at 997-98.  
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“implied license at Carloss’s home had not been revoked” by the “No 
Trespassing” signs.28 As for the second issue, the court ruled that “[u]nder 
[the] circumstances, we cannot say that the officers exceeded the implied 
license they had to approach the home and knock” as they “were no doubt 
encouraged to remain a bit longer, hoping someone would respond to their 
knock, because they heard movement inside the house and [because they] 
received no request from inside the house to depart.”29 The Tenth Circuit 
therefore affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Carloss’s motion to 
suppress the evidence discovered during the search.
30
 
III. The State of the Law Before United States v. Carloss 
A. The Implied License to Engage in a “Knock and Talk” 
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, policing tactics expanded at an 
increasingly rapid pace, driven both by technology and by the Supreme 
Court’s growing deference to law enforcement.31 One tactic to emerge out 
of this era of expansion was the knock and talk. Essentially, a knock and 
talk is “a procedure used by law enforcement officers, under which they 
approach the door of a residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants, 
typically to obtain more information regarding a criminal investigation or to 
obtain consent to search where probable cause is lacking.”32 Although it is 
undoubted that law enforcement officers have long used this strategy in 
order to gather criminal investigative information, only within the last fifty 
years has the constitutionality of the knock and talk been specifically 
examined by American courts. 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 993-95. 
 29. Id. at 998.  
 30. Id. at 999. 
 31. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013) (holding that police 
officers may, if based on exigency and the “totality of the circumstances,” obtain a blood 
sample from a suspected drunk driver without a warrant); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 
450-52 (1989) (finding that an officer’s helicopter-aided observations into the 
constitutionally protected area surrounding the defendant’s home without a warrant did not 
constitute a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (holding that the 
installation of a pen register, without a warrant, to record the numbers dialed by the 
defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) 
(finding that a police officer may stop and “frisk” a person if the officer has “reason to 
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”).  
 32. Kletter, supra note 4.  
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While not expressly using the phrase “knock and talk,” Davis v. United 
States
33
 is nonetheless commonly cited as the starting point for modern-day 
knock and talk jurisprudence.
34
 In Davis, United States Customs agents and 
Los Angeles Police Department officers approached the home of A.D. 
Davis in order to investigate him for suspicion of marijuana distribution.
35
 
After approaching the home and knocking on the door, the officers were 
greeted by Davis’s eight-year-old daughter, who allowed the officers to 
enter the home.
36
 Once inside the house, the officers discovered marijuana 
and arrested Davis, who was in bed at the time; all of the investigation 
occurred without a warrant.
37
 After the trial court denied Davis’s motion to 
suppress the marijuana evidence, leading to Davis’s conviction, Davis 
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.
38
  
In affirming the decision of the trial court and Davis’s conviction, the 
Ninth Circuit noted, in an oft-quoted passage, that: 
Absent express orders from the [resident], there is no rule of 
private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a 
condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone 
openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and 
knock on the front door of any man's “castle” with the honest 
intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof—whether the 
questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.
39
 
In affirming Davis’s conviction, the court justified the conduct of the 
officers in a variety of ways, including noting that “[t]he time of day, 
coupled with the openness of the officers’ approach” ruled out the possible 
danger of persons approaching a home unannounced, and that the officers 
did not engage in any “peeping Tom”-type invasion of privacy.40 Implicit in 
the court’s decision, though, was the concept of a particular societal norm, 
namely, that it is generally considered acceptable to approach the front door 
of a neighbor. Whether police may likewise approach a home as part of 
                                                                                                                 
 33. 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964).  
 34. See United States v. Holmes, No. 3:14-cr-21-J-32PDB, 2014 WL 10679855, at *5 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2014) (noting that Davis v. United States is the “oft-cited rationale for 
sanctioning the ‘knock and talk’”).  
 35. Davis, 327 F.2d at 302.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 302-03.  
 39. Id. at 303.  
 40. Id. at 304.  
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routine investigation became an increasingly important point of contention 
in later decisions addressing the constitutionality of the knock and talk. 
While numerous lower courts have considered the validity of knock and 
talks since Davis,
41
 the Supreme Court took nearly fifty years to provide 
any insight into the constitutionality of the policing tactic, finally discussing 
the legality of the knock and talk in a 2011 case, Kentucky v. King.
42
 In 
King, police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, set up a controlled buy of 
crack cocaine from a known drug dealer outside of his apartment building.
43
 
After completing the sale, uniformed officers were radioed to apprehend the 
dealer before he entered his apartment; however, before the officers could 
reach him, the dealer entered an unknown apartment at the end of a 
breezeway.
44
 Smelling marijuana emanating from one of the two 
apartments at the end of the breezeway, the officers “banged on the 
[identified] apartment door ‘as loud as [they] could’ and announced, ‘“This 
is the police.”’45 Fearing the destruction of evidence, based on sounds of 
“things . . . being moved inside the apartment,” one of the officers kicked in 
the door and found three people: the respondent King, King’s girlfriend, 
and a friend of King’s who was smoking marijuana.46 During a protective 
sweep of the apartment, the officers also found marijuana and powder 
cocaine within the apartment.
47
 The drug dealer sought initially was later 
located in the second apartment (the one not entered by the police).
48
 King’s 
subsequent motion to suppress the evidence of the drugs located in his 
apartment was denied by the trial court, and he was convicted of drug 
                                                                                                                 
 41. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
officer’s knock and talk to investigate suspicious 911 calls was not prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Federal courts 
have recognized the ‘knock and talk’ strategy as a reasonable investigative tool . . . .”); 
United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “no suspicion 
needed to be shown in order to justify the ‘knock and talk’”).  
 42. 563 U.S. 452 (2011). It should be noted that, prior to King, Justice Rehnquist once 
discussed knock and talks as a policing tactic in his dissent from Dunaway v. New York: 
“[There is not] anything in the Fourth Amendment that prevents the police from knocking on 
the door of a person's house and when the person answers the door, inquiring whether he is 
willing to answer questions that they wish to put to him.” 442 U.S. 200, 222 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 43. King, 563 U.S. at 455.  
 44. Id. at 456.  
 45. Id. (alteration in original). 
 46. Id. at 456-57.  
 47. Id. at 457.  
 48. Id.  
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trafficking.
49
 The trial court’s decision was affirmed by the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals; the verdict, however, was later reversed by the Kentucky 
Supreme Court.
50
 The State then appealed the decision to the United States 
Supreme Court.
51
 
Although the Supreme Court primarily focused on other topics, a single 
section within the King decision, only three paragraphs in length, became 
the Court’s first tacit acceptance of the knock and talk as a valid policing 
tactic. Importantly, the Court stated, “When law enforcement officers who 
are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any 
private citizen might do.”52 The Court further explained that the subject of 
an attempted knock and talk is under no obligation to actually speak with 
the police officers, noting that “whether the person who knocks on the 
door . . . is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no 
obligation to open the door or to speak.”53 The Court further found that 
“even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, 
the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may 
refuse to answer any questions at any time.”54 
Despite the brevity of its knock and talk discussion, critical for our 
discussion is the fact that, like the Ninth Circuit in Davis, the Supreme 
Court rooted its decision in societal norms. As stated previously, the 
Supreme Court accepted knock and talks because knocking on the front 
door of a home is “no more than any private citizen might do.”55 The 
Supreme Court, like other courts before it, recognized that in a functioning 
society, various persons—whether they be neighbors, Girl Scouts, or the 
police—may have legitimate reasons for approaching a person’s home to 
speak with its occupants.  
This principle was resolutely confirmed in Florida v. Jardines,
56
 as the 
Supreme Court directly addressed the concept of the knock and talk. In 
Jardines, detectives from the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD), in 
conjunction with agents from the federal Drug Enforcement 
Administration, set up a surveillance operation on Jardines’s home, based 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 457-58.  
 51. Id. at 458. 
 52. Id. at 469.  
 53. Id. at 469-70. 
 54. Id. at 470.  
 55. Id. at 469.  
 56. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
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on an unverified tip that Jardines was growing marijuana within the home.
57
 
After examining the house to determine if anyone was inside,
58
 two 
detectives from the MDPD approached the home with a drug-sniffing dog, 
who alerted the detectives to the presence of narcotics within the home by 
sniffing at the base of the home’s front door.59 Armed with this information, 
one of the MDPD detectives applied for and received a warrant to search 
the home; upon execution of the warrant, several marijuana plants were 
recovered.
60
 At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the evidence of the plants, 
which the trial court granted; however, the Florida District Court of Appeal 
reversed.
61
 On discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the 
appellate court’s decision, instead reinstating the decision of the trial court; 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited question 
of “whether the officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”62 
Before reaching its holding in the case, the Supreme Court first noted 
that the home is “first among equals” when it comes to Fourth Amendment 
protections and that it is the “right of [every] man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”63 The 
Court noted that this level of protection extends to the home’s curtilage as 
well because the curtilage “enjoys protection as part of the home itself.”64 
Finally, the Court noted that “[t]his right would be of little practical value if 
the State’s agents could stand [on] a home’s porch . . . and trawl for 
evidence with impunity.”65 
After establishing the level of protection afforded the home and its 
curtilage, the Court directly addressed the concept of the knock and talk, 
stating that “[w]e have . . . recognized that ‘the knocker on the front door is 
treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to 
the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.’”66 And, in a 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 3.  
 58. It should be noted here that, although the Jardines opinion discusses the legitimacy 
of the knock and talk as a policing tactic, the law enforcement officers never actually 
conducted a knock and talk in the case.  
 59. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 4.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 5. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 6 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 8 (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)).  
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passage that has been cited by nearly every knock and talk case since the 
publishing of Jardines, the Court held: 
This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the 
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be 
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. . . . 
Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a 
home and knock, precisely because that is “no more than any 
private citizen might do.”67 
The Court then gave contours to its newly stated rule, noting that “[t]he 
scope of a license [to approach]—express or implied—is limited not only to 
a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”68 Further, the Court wrote 
that “[t]o find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes 
unwelcome)” but that “to spot that same visitor exploring the front path 
with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden . . . 
would inspire most of us to—well, call the police.”69 Based on this, the 
Court held that “[t]he government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate 
the home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment” and affirmed the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
decision to suppress the information gathered from the search of Jardines’s 
home.
70
  
Echoing both Davis and King, the Supreme Court explained the rationale 
for its new rule by relying on societal norms, finding that “the background 
social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to 
conduct a search.”71 Importantly, the Court expanded on the basis for the 
implied license to approach the home, tying this societal norm to our 
concepts of property rights and trespass.
72
 Thus, the Court found no reason 
to address whether the detectives’ conduct failed the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test established in Katz v. United States
73
 because “[o]ne virtue 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)).  
 68. Id. at 9.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 11-12.  
 71. Id. at 9.  
 72. Id. at 11.  
 73. In his landmark concurrence (later adopted by the majority in Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979)), Justice Harlan explained what became known as the Katz, or 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” test: “My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 
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of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy 
cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically 
intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish 
that a search occurred.”74 
Thus, post-Jardines, the following axioms have emerged: (1) police 
officers have an implied license to approach the front of a home to conduct 
a knock and talk; (2) the occupant of the home is under no duty to answer 
the door or to answer any questions posed by the officers; (3) the implied 
license to approach is rooted in societal norms (that is, rooted in our 
conceptions of privacy, property rights and trespass); and (4) based on these 
societal norms, the implied license is limited both to a particular area and 
for a specific purpose. The exact limitations on this implied license, 
however, remain unclear.  
B. “No Trespassing” Signs and the Revocation of the Implied License to 
Approach 
Because the Jardines Court left the exact scope of the limitations on the 
implied license unclear (perhaps by design), significant gray areas still exist 
within the law as to the precise boundaries of the license implied in 
Jardines. In particular, the effect of “No Trespassing” signs on the implied 
license to approach a home is one such issue that remains unresolved.  
1. “No Trespassing” Signs and the Supreme Court 
Before discussing the state of the law concerning the nexus between “No 
Trespassing” signs, the implied license, and knock and talks, it is prudent to 
examine the current state of Supreme Court law concerning “No 
Trespassing” signs. Thus far, the Supreme Court has twice discussed “No 
Trespassing” signs or other similar measures, both, importantly, outside the 
context of knock and talks. First, in Breard v. City of Alexandria,
75
 a 1951 
case examining the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting door-to-
door solicitation, the Supreme Court found that “[i]t is true that the knocker 
                                                                                                                 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The case law surrounding the Katz test is long, complicated, 
ever-evolving, and best left for another day.  
 74. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11. Interestingly (and perhaps to maintain the importance of 
the Katz test in future Fourth Amendment cases), Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor, wrote a concurring opinion, noting that the case could have been decided on 
either trespassory or privacy grounds: “Was this activity a trespass? Yes, as the Court holds 
today. Was it also an invasion of privacy? Yes, that as well.” Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., 
concurring).  
 75. 341 U.S. 622 (1951), abrogated on other grounds by Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
530 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:519 
 
 
on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, 
justifying ingress to the home . . . . When such visitors are barred from 
premises by notice or order, however, subsequent trespasses have been 
punished.”76 Second, in Oliver v. United States,77 the Supreme Court in 
1984 held that, under the Katz test, officers may inspect open fields without 
a warrant, even in the presence of “No Trespassing” signs and other 
measures taken to prevent ingress into the open field, because such 
measures do not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
traditionally “unprotected” open field domain.78 
While these cases seem to be instructive with respect to how the 
Supreme Court might view “No Trespassing” signs and other similar 
measures post-Jardines, any insight to be gained from either Breard or 
Oliver is problematic. In Breard and similar cases, the police are generally 
given deference by the courts to perform acts beyond what a private citizen 
could do, so that they may be able to do their job.
79
 Although Breard 
endorsed the notion that notice could bar someone from entering the land of 
another, as Oliver and the majority in Carloss pointed out, state law is not 
always dispositive of “reasonableness” notions under the Fourth 
Amendment; instead “in asking whether the officers' actions . . . were 
reasonable, we should look to the particular circumstances before us, and 
not state statutes that may allow for trespass actions.”80 As such, Breard’s 
support for punishment of subsequent trespasses after notice may not hold 
in the law enforcement context.  
Second, Oliver (decided in 1984) was decided before the revival of the 
trespassory test within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Prior to Katz, it 
was generally understood that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred 
without some physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.
81
 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 626. As noted supra note 66, the Jardines court cited part of this passage in its 
justification for confirming the implicit license to approach a home.  
 77. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 78. Id. at 182-83.  
 79. See, for example, the cases noted supra note 31. 
 80. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1001 (10th Cir. 2016). The Oliver Court also 
reached this conclusion: “Nor is the government's intrusion upon an open field a ‘search’ in 
the constitutional sense because that intrusion is a trespass at common law. The existence of 
a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are 
legitimate.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183.  
 81. E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1928) (finding that no 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred as a result of listening to private conversations held 
within the defendant’s home and office because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or 
offices”).  
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Katz, as it has been commonly understood, rejected a property-based 
approach espoused by prior courts in favor of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, stating that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”82 However, in United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia revived the 
trespassory test for Fourth Amendment purposes, stating that the “Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test.”83 Given that Jardines was decided 
shortly after Jones and relied on common law property rights and trespass 
notions, the Court may be signaling a trend towards reliance on the 
trespassory test, which could potentially end in a situation where certain 
trespasses create Fourth Amendment violations, if such trespasses were to 
occur within a constitutionally protected area.
84
  
Two principles could potentially be gleaned from Breard, Oliver, and 
related Supreme Court decisions surrounding trespass and the Fourth 
Amendment, however. First, while Breard suggests that notice can bar 
someone from entering the land of another, the same principle may not hold 
for law enforcement. And second, the Supreme Court’s revival of and trend 
towards the trespassory test could perhaps affect whether law enforcement 
may trespass onto the land of another without violating the Fourth 
Amendment. These two principles appear to exist in tension, an issue ripe 
for consideration by future courts. As it stands now, however, it is unclear 
how the Supreme Court will view “No Trespassing” signs in the Fourth 
Amendment “curtilage” and “open fields” context, given current precedent 
and the recent ideological shift.  
2. “No Trespassing Signs,” the Implied License, and Federal and State 
Courts  
American courts have varied greatly on what effect, if any, “No 
Trespassing” signs have on the implied license given to police to approach 
a home in order to conduct a knock and talk. Before understanding how 
various courts have treated “No Trespassing” signs, though, the cases must 
first be divided into two camps: cases involving only No Trespassing signs 
(“Group 1” cases) and cases involving “No Trespassing” signs in addition 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).  
 83. 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).  
 84. It should be noted here that, under Jones, a “trespass” is not a statutory trespass; 
instead a trespass (and search) occurs when law enforcement encroaches on a 
constitutionally protected area, such as the curtilage of a home. See id. at 405-06. As such, 
Oliver’s holding may well still be in effect, because the Oliver Court did not view open 
fields as constitutionally protected. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83.  
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to other privacy measures (“Group 2” cases). Additionally, the cases 
involving only “No Trespassing” signs can be divided into two sub-groups: 
cases finding a revocation of the implied license (“Group 1A” cases) and 
those holding that the implied license still existed (“Group 1B” cases). This 
Note will tackle each group individually in order to provide clarity on the 
state of the law. Additionally, this categorization will make it easier both to 
establish where United States v. Carloss fits within current case law and to 
discuss how the Tenth Circuit’s approach compares to that of other courts 
in similar situations.  
Unlike the other groups, Group 1A cases, in which “No Trespassing” 
signs alone served to revoke the implied license to approach a home to 
conduct a “knock and talk,” are less common. But, like other cases 
involving “No Trespassing” signs and the implied license to approach, the 
court’s reasoning is rooted in the privacy expectations of the home’s 
occupant—namely, that “No Trespassing” signs express a desire for privacy 
that revokes the implied license.
85
 However, the viability of the logic of 
Group 1A cases has been called into question post-Jardines. Indeed, as 
noted in Carloss, the Tenth Circuit could not find “any post-Jardines 
authority holding that a resident can revoke the implied license to approach 
his home and knock on the front door simply by posting a ‘No Trespassing’ 
sign.”86 This is not to say that the logic is dead altogether, though, because 
Jardines never addressed “No Trespassing” signs, instead focusing on 
protecting the sanctity of the home and the constraints of the knock and 
talk—something lower courts have already considered for many years.  
Like Group 1A cases, the Group 1B line of cases, holding that “No 
Trespassing” signs do not revoke the implied license to approach the home, 
appears to follow a clear theme. In these cases, the courts have almost 
universally held that the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights had not 
been violated because the homeowner had not exhibited a clear expectation 
of privacy (or, at least a clear enough expression to revoke the implied 
license) through the use of the “No Trespassing” signs.87 Unlike Group 1A 
                                                                                                                 
 85. E.g., State v. Roubique, 421 So. 2d 859, 862 (La. 1982) (noting that the “sign at the 
road’s entrance is ample evidence of [the defendant’s] intent to preserve his privacy” and 
that the policer officer “invaded [the defendant’s] constitutionally protected right to privacy 
when he entered the posted property”); State v. Blackwell, No. E2009-00043-CCA-R3-CD, 
2010 WL 454864, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2010) (holding that “the presence of the 
‘No Trespassing’ sign evinced an actual subjective expectation of privacy and a revocation 
of the ‘implied invitation’ of the front door”). 
 86. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 87. E.g., State v. Hornback, 871 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (agreeing with 
the trial court’s decision that the presence of “No Trespassing” signs “was not dispositive of 
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cases, however, several post-Jardines courts have agreed that “No 
Trespassing” signs did not revoke the implied license to approach the 
home.
88
 Although decided pre-Jardines, the Sixth Circuit’s 2003 decision in 
United States v. Hopper
89
 nicely illustrates the reasoning of Group 1B 
cases.  
In Hopper, law enforcement officers suspected Jeffrey Hopper and his 
partner of conducting a large-scale marijuana growing operation.
90
 After 
executing a search warrant on the residence of Hopper’s partner and 
discovering growing paraphernalia, the officers proceeded to Hopper’s 
residence in order to obtain consent to search his home, which had three 
“No Trespassing” signs posted within visual distance of the home.91 When 
several attempts to search the property failed, Hopper’s wife eventually 
consented to a search of the home, which resulted in the discovery of 350 
marijuana plants, weapons, and cash.
92
 After his motion to suppress such 
evidence was denied, Hopper entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving 
the right to appeal the motion to suppress.
93
  
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit found, inter alia, 
that, based on the four factor test outlined in United States v. Dunn,
94
 the 
“No Trespassing” signs alone did not create a constitutionally protected 
                                                                                                                 
the constitutional issue”); Wysong v. State, 614 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that “No Trespassing” signs do not “establish a zone of privacy” because “‘No 
Trespassing’ signs do not render a doorway to be a constitutionally protected area”).  
 88. E.g., Davis v. City of Milwaukee, No. 13-CV-982-JPS, 2015 WL 5010459, at *13 
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2015) (holding that “signs stating ‘Private Property’ or ‘No 
Trespassing’ do not, by themselves, create an impenetrable privacy zone”); United States v. 
Jones, No. 4:13cr00011-003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2013) (holding 
that the existence of “No Trespassing” signs are “evidence of the owner’s desire for privacy, 
but they do not expand his rights under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 89. 58 F. App’x 619 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 90. Id. at 621.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 621-22.  
 93. Id. at 622.  
 94. 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four 
factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is 
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area 
is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people 
passing by. 
Id. Under the prevailing understanding, the Dunn test creates a division between 
constitutionally protected curtilage and “open fields,” which the Oliver Court found were not 
afforded protection from warrantless searches.  
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curtilage area around Hopper’s home.95 Additionally, the court noted that 
even if the area around Hopper’s home was protected curtilage under the 
Dunn test, “the actions of the police . . . would not have violated the Fourth 
Amendment because law enforcement officials may encroach upon the 
curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants,” 
seemingly creating an ironclad license to approach that a homeowner 
cannot revoke.
96
 
Because of the variability of the circumstances of each case, Group 2 
courts, in examining situations concerning “No Trespassing” signs and 
additional privacy measures (such as fences, gates, and other efforts used 
by homeowners to enhance privacy), have generally taken a case-by-case 
approach to determine whether the implied license had been revoked. Some 
courts have ruled that the implied license had been revoked;
97
 others have 
ruled the opposite.
98
 However, as one court noted, patterns have emerged, 
shedding light onto where courts have generally fallen in Group 2 cases:  
Some categorical rules apply in the “knock and talk” context: it 
would not be okay to conduct one at a house with a high 
perimeter fence and a locked gate, with a solid wall and a closed 
entry, or with a resident shouting, “stay off my property” . . . . 
But circumstances shy of those have led courts to take a case-by-
case approach . . . that considers the many variables that officers 
confront when conducting a “knock and talk.”99  
In weighing these “many variables” with which officers can be confronted, 
some courts have made use of the Dunn test, discussed first in the context 
of Hopper, supra, to determine whether the implied license has been 
revoked.
100
 Madruga v. County of Riverside
101
 illustrates an application of 
the Dunn test in this context.  
                                                                                                                 
 95. Hopper, 58 F. App’x at 623.  
 96. Id.  
 97. E.g., Edens v. Kennedy, 112 F. App’x 870, 875 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
enclosing a home with a fence, locked gates, and “No Trespassing” signs would create an 
“elevated expectation of privacy”). 
 98. E.g., Allender v. Huesman, No. IP01-1718-C-T/K, 2003 WL 23142184, at *4-5 
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2003) (finding that a wooden rail, wire fence, and “No Trespassing” 
signs did not create a constitutionally protected area).  
 99. United States v. Holmes, No. 3:14-cr-21-J-32PDB, 2014 WL 10679855, at *8 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Moffitt, 233 F. App’x 409, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (overruled on different grounds); 
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In Madruga, the plaintiff, Michael Madruga, sued the county in which 
his home was located, the county sheriff’s department, and several officers 
after an early morning warrantless entry onto his property by the officers in 
question. The officers visited Madruga’s property in order to investigate a 
car accident in which Madruga was involved earlier that day.
102
 Madruga’s 
home was surrounded by a tall, cinder-block fence, with two gates that were 
closed but unlocked, and two signs proclaiming the presence of a guard 
dog.
103
 On the night in question, one officer from the sheriff’s department 
entered Madruga’s property without a warrant after 1:00 a.m. to speak with 
him.
104
 Madruga declined to speak with the police, but Madruga’s wife 
allowed the officer into the home, where a struggle ensued, leading to 
Madruga’s arrest.105  
Using the four factors outlined in Dunn, the court concluded that the 
front courtyard was part of the curtilage of Madruga’s home and was 
therefore constitutionally protected.
106
 Additionally, the court noted that 
while “[t]he knock and talk rule is grounded on the understanding that the 
curtilage . . . is open to the public to use,” that “assumption may prove 
untrue, specifically when a homeowner has taken additional measures to 
impede or otherwise block access to the front door by the viewing 
public.”107 As such, “it should have . . . been clear to [the officer] that the 
generally understood implied invitation to walk up to the front of the home 
and talk to the home’s occupants was revoked.”108 
As demonstrated in Madruga, the Dunn curtilage test may provide a path 
through the thicket created by these “No Trespassing” sign cases. As noted 
previously, the Dunn test separates constitutionally protected “curtilage” 
                                                                                                                 
United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:08cr32-SPM, 2009 WL 762203, at *5-8 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 
18, 2009). 
 101. 431 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 102. Id. at 1051-52. 
 103. Id. at 1052-53. It should be noted that, while Madruga’s two signs were not 
specifically “No Trespassing” signs, they, like “No Trespassing” signs, aimed to 
communicate the same message on some level: namely, uninvited visitors are generally not 
welcome.  
 104. Id. at 1052-54. 
 105. Id. at 1054. 
 106. Id. at 1056.  
 107. Id. at 1059-60 (citations omitted). Although some courts have addressed time of day 
when discussing the implied license, the Madruga court did not make mention of the fact 
that the officers approached Madruga’s home after midnight in their analysis, which seems 
odd given the court’s clear frustration with the conduct of the officers.  
 108. Id. at 1058.  
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from open fields, which are not afforded Fourth Amendment protections.
109
 
While not explicitly stated by the Madruga court, the decision seemed to 
indicate that “No Trespassing” or similar signs either on or in 
constitutionally protected curtilage can serve to revoke the implied license 
to approach the home.
110
 While the Hopper court did not reach this same 
result, it reached its conclusion by essentially giving the police an 
unfettered right to encroach on the curtilage, stating that law enforcement 
can always approach to conduct a knock and talk, going further than other 
courts have with respect to law enforcement.
111
 As such, the Dunn test may 
prove to be an effective tool to determine whether “No Trespassing” signs 
serve to revoke the implied license.  
Although American courts are decidedly mixed on the effect of “No 
Trespassing” signs (and other privacy-enhancing measures) and the implied 
license to approach a home to conduct a knock and talk, two patterns have 
thus far emerged. First, whether revoking the implied license or not, courts 
have consistently looked to a defendant’s expectation of privacy in order to 
gauge the impact of the signs. And second, the Dunn test has frequently 
been employed in cases to help determine what areas of a person’s property 
should be afforded Fourth Amendment protections.  
C. Waiting to Be Received and Revocation of the Implied License to 
Approach 
As stated previously, almost every knock and talk case post-Jardines has 
quoted the case’s central principle: “This implicit license [to approach a 
home] typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, 
knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to 
linger longer) leave.”112 Implicit in this principle is the proposition that the 
police, like any other individual in society, may not linger on a person’s 
front porch indefinitely in order to attempt to speak with the occupants. 
Indeed, the King Court seemed to reach this same conclusion, stating that 
“[w]hen the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See supra note 94.  
 110. See Madruga, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60 (noting that while an officer may 
generally cross the curtilage to conduct a knock and talk, “privacy enhancement made to the 
curtilage by the homeowner would serve to apprise the officer . . . that access to the home's 
front door would require the homeowner's pre-approval”). 
 111. United States v. Hopper, 58 F. App’x 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 112. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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or to speak, ‘the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low 
point.’”113 
However, unlike the volumes of case law surrounding the approach of 
the home by law enforcement, there has been noticeably little litigation on 
how long the police can remain on a person’s front porch before the limited 
implied license has expired, perhaps due to the relative newness of the 
Jardines decision, perhaps due to the unusual circumstances that would be 
required for the issue to even arise in the first place. Regardless, there 
appears to be only one case (prior to Carloss) that considered how long the 
police can constitutionally remain at a home. 
That case, J.K. v. State,
114
 decided by the Court of Appeals of Indiana, 
involved the prosecution of J.K., a juvenile at the time, for “illegal 
possession of alcohol, illegal consumption of alcohol, and aiding illegal 
consumption of alcohol.”115 In the early morning hours, the Pulaski County 
Sheriff’s Department received a complaint alleging that a group “of 
juveniles were pushing a shopping cart through the neighborhood, making 
noise, and causing dogs to bark.”116 Two local police officers and a reserve 
deputy from the sheriff’s department arrived at J.K.’s residence at 
approximately 1:11 a.m. and observed several cars parked outside the 
residence, including a pickup truck with a shopping cart in the bed (which 
the police believed was stolen from a local store).
117
 As one officer 
approached the front door, the other two officers moved through the back 
yard of the home to prevent any juveniles from fleeing the scene; one of the 
officers in the back yard observed empty alcohol containers in the home’s 
kitchen.
118
 The first officer knocked on the front door but received no 
answer.
119
 After receiving no answer from inside the home, the officers 
stayed on the front porch and at the back door for approximately one hour, 
yelling to the occupants inside.
120
  
After approximately one hour had passed, a tow truck arrived, called by 
the police to tow the truck holding the shopping cart.
121
 At this point, the 
juvenile owner of the truck exited the home and was told to retrieve the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011) (citation omitted).  
 114. 8 N.E.3d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
 115. Id. at 226-27.  
 116. Id. at 227.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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owner of the house (J.K.).
122
 J.K., who was on the phone with his mother, 
came outside the house; the officers spoke to both J.K. and his mother 
before entering the home, without a warrant, to search the residence, where 
they discovered signs of underage drinking.
123
  
Approximately three months after the incident in question, the State filed 
a delinquency petition against J.K.
124
 In response, J.K. filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence discovered during the search, which was denied by 
the trial court.
125
 The trial court then found J.K. to be a delinquent child, 
and J.K. appealed to the Court of Appeals of Indiana.
126
 Although the court 
discussed many issues in the case (including standard of review, the 
officer’s entry into the back yard, exigent circumstances, and the search of 
the home),
127
 the court’s discussion of the knock and talk conducted by the 
officers is most pertinent to the matter at hand.  
In determining whether the officer’s initial attempt at a knock and talk 
was unconstitutional, the court applied the main principle from Jardines,
128
 
noting that “[t]his statement implies that a failure to leave after a brief 
period exceeds the implied invitation to enter one’s curtilage and would 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”129 The court further stated that an occupant 
of a home is under no obligation to answer the door (quoting King) and that 
if “residents exercise this right [to not answer the door], officers generally 
must leave and secure a warrant if they want to pursue the matter.”130 After 
establishing this foundation, the court concluded “that the officers’ conduct 
was an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment” 
because “[t]he officers’ actions . . . extended well beyond the implied 
invitation to approach a citizen’s front door.”131 The court further 
admonished the officers’ conduct, stating: 
If three men with guns and flashlights were to surround the 
average person's home in the wee hours of the morning, knock 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 227-28.  
 123. Id. at 228.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. See generally id. at 228-31, 236-39.  
 128. As a reminder: “This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the 
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent 
invitation to linger longer) leave.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). 
 129. J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 232.  
 130. Id. (quoting Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2006)).  
 131. Id.  
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for over forty-five minutes, and yell inside demanding the 
occupants open the door, this situation would—like the Court 
noted in Jardines—inspire that homeowner to call the police.132 
Significantly, the court noted that the length of time the officers were at the 
home was, in and of itself, unconstitutional: “Setting aside the officers’ 
conduct . . . , the length of time the officers remained there would alone 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment” because the “investigation 
[had] reached a ‘conspicuously low point.’”133 
Although J.K. thus far appears to be the only case dealing with the time 
limit imposed on implied license and how long the police can remain inside 
the curtilage before violating the Fourth Amendment, a few key principles 
can be gleaned from the court’s decision. First, the implied license is 
limited by both conduct (as was the case in Jardines) and time. And second, 
the implied license can be exceeded by an extended time alone, even absent 
inappropriate or aggressive officer conduct, although the exact requisite 
amount of time remains unclear. 
D. Summary—Where the Law Stands Before Carloss 
At this point, a brief summary of the state of the law prior to Carloss 
may be useful, before diving into the reasoning and rationale offered by the 
Tenth Circuit in reaching its decision. First, the Supreme Court (and a large 
swath of lower courts) has recognized an implied license given to law 
enforcement to approach a home in order to conduct a knock and talk, and 
this implied license derives authority from societal norms. Second, the 
Supreme Court has thus far offered little guidance on the issue of “No 
Trespassing” signs for Fourth Amendment purposes. Third, while lower 
courts have taken varied approaches with respect to the effect of “No 
Trespassing” signs on the implied license to approach a home, such signs 
may often serve to revoke the implied license, and the Dunn test has proved 
especially helpful in this area. And finally, almost no courts have explored 
the revocation of the implied license based on the “linger” prong of the 
Jardines rule, but it remains clear that some threshold exists beyond which 
the implied license granted to approach and remain briefly would be 
exceeded.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 232-33 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011)).  
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IV. The Reasoning of the Carloss Court 
This Note turns now to the reasoning and analysis underlying the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Carloss. The majority opinion, written by Judge Ebel 
and joined by Chief Judge Tymkovich, emphasizes the decision by 
beginning with the rule, followed with an analysis, and concluded first that 
the “officers [in the case] did not violate the Fourth Amendment by going 
to the front door and knocking, seeking to speak with Carloss,” before 
diving into the reasoning for its decision.
134
 In doing so, the court outlined 
several principles that have already been covered in this Note, notably that: 
(1) police officers have the right to conduct a knock and talk under the 
Fourth Amendment; (2) Jardines reaffirmed prior Tenth Circuit law 
upholding knock and talks; and (3) the constitutionality of the knock and 
talk is rooted in the implied license “for members of the public to go onto 
the curtilage of [a] home in order to knock on the front door.”135 
The court spent the bulk of its decision, though, explaining why the “No 
Trespassing” signs on Carloss’s property did not revoke the implied license. 
Citing two state cases (neither of which fall within the Tenth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction) as support, the court first stated the rule on which it based its 
decision: “Whether [‘No Trespassing’ signs revoke the implied license] 
depends on the context in which a member of the public, or an officer 
seeking to conduct a knock-and-talk, encountered the signs and the message 
that those signs would have conveyed to an objective officer, or member of 
the public, under the circumstances.”136 
Before applying its newly formulated rule to Carloss’s case, the court 
stated that “just the presence of a ‘No Trespassing’ sign is not alone 
sufficient to convey to an objective officer . . . that he cannot go to the front 
door and knock,” thus rejecting the “talismanic quality Carloss attributes to 
them.”137 In this respect, the Tenth Circuit appears to side with Group 1B 
courts (discussed supra Part III), which held that “No Trespassing” signs 
alone do not revoke the implied license. However, based on its previously 
stated rule, the Tenth Circuit seemed to indicate that “No Trespassing” 
signs could revoke the implied license if an objective observer (whether it 
be a member of the public at large or a law enforcement official) would 
                                                                                                                 
 134. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 991 (10th Cir. 2016).  
 135. Id. at 992-94.  
 136. Id. at 994.  
 137. Id. at 995.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/6
2018]       NOTES 541 
 
 
believe that the implied license had been revoked—a point that Judge 
Gorsuch made clear in his dissent.
138
  
Next, the court pointed out that all but one of the “No Trespassing” signs 
were in the unenclosed front and side yards and along the driveway—areas 
the Tenth Circuit had already determined were “open fields” and not 
protected curtilage, because, citing prior Tenth Circuit decisions, “Carloss 
[did] not expressly claim that these areas were part of the home’s 
curtilage—and it was Carloss’s burden to establish what was included in 
the home’s curtilage.”139 Indeed, in both his opening brief and in his 
response brief, Carloss made no argument that the front and side yards were 
protected curtilage—only that the front porch constituted protected 
curtilage.
140
 
Based on the determination that neither the front nor side yards were 
“curtilage,” but instead were “open fields,” the court concluded that the 
signs in the yard “would not have conveyed to an objective officer, or 
member of the public, that he could not walk up to the porch and knock on 
the front door and attempt to contact the occupants” because “[i]t is well-
established that ‘No Trespassing’ signs will not prevent an officer from 
entering privately owned ‘open fields.’”141 The court found this to be true 
“even though the officers’ entry into the yard might be considered a 
trespass at common law . . . or might have violated Oklahoma statutory 
law.”142 
Finally, the court concluded that the sign on the front door “was 
ambiguous and did not clearly revoke the implied license extended to 
members of the public, including police officers, to enter the home’s 
curtilage and knock on the front door.”143 The court reasoned that “on its 
                                                                                                                 
 138. “The sole controlling opinion in this case doesn’t suggest that No Trespassing signs 
are categorically insufficient to revoke the implied license but suggests only that 
homeowners should be more punctilious with their choice and placement of signs than the 
homeowner here.” Id. at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 139. Id. at 995 (majority opinion).  
 140. See Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellant, supra note 25, at 14-18, 2014 WL 
580562, at *10-14; Reply Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 2, United States v. Carloss, 818 
F.3d 988 (2016) (No. 13-7082), 2014 WL 1512694, at *2.  
 141. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 995-96 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013), and 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984)).  
 142. Id. at 996.  
 143. Id. The “ambiguous” sign stated: “Posted Private Property Hunting, Fishing, 
Trapping or Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators Will Be 
Prosecuted.” Id. Of note, it appears that the court tacitly accepts Carloss’s argument that the 
front porch of the house was protected curtilage. See id. (noting that on the front door “No 
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face, this sign does not appear to be directed to people who desire to 
approach and speak directly with the occupants of the home in the ordinary 
course of societally accepted discourse” and instead “could have simply 
been reiterating that such recreational activities would not be allowed on 
the property generally.”144 As such, “[t]he message here does not clearly 
and unambiguously tell the mail carrier, pizza deliverer, or police officer 
that they cannot knock on the front door seeking a consensual conversation 
with those who live there.”145 Because both the yard signs and the sign on 
the front door would not lead an objective observer to conclude that the 
implied license had been revoked, the Tenth Circuit ruled that “the officers 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they went onto the porch and 
knocked on the front door of the house in which Carloss lived.”146 
Unlike its robust discussion of the implied license revocation issue, the 
Carloss court spent comparatively little time discussing Carloss’s 
contention that the officers exceeded their implied license by lingering too 
long on the porch waiting for a response from inside. In fact, the court took 
only one paragraph to dismiss Carloss’s claim. In doing so, the Tenth 
Circuit cited the Jardines rule before declining “to place a specific time 
limit on how long a person can knock before exceeding the scope of [the] 
implied license.”147 Instead, the court simply concluded that the officers did 
not exceed the implied license, because they only knocked for “‘several 
minutes’ or ‘a minute or two,’” they were “no doubt encouraged to remain a 
bit longer . . . because they heard movement inside the house and received 
no request from inside the house to depart,” and there was “no suggestion 
that the officers knocked aggressively or demanded entry.”148 
V. Analysis of the Court’s Decision 
A. The Court’s Revocation Analysis: Potential Problems 
Although the Tenth Circuit took a fairly novel approach to discussing 
and deciding the revocation issue in Carloss, there are two potential 
problems with its ruling. First, its ruling may create headaches for law 
enforcement and for the judiciary in future cases, since the rule seems to 
                                                                                                                 
Trespassing” sign did not revoke the implied license “to enter the home's curtilage and 
knock on the front door”).  
 144. Id. at 996-97.  
 145. Id. at 997.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 998.  
 148. Id.  
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circumvent the more bright-line standards developed by other courts to 
address “No Trespassing” signs and revocation of the implied license. And 
second, the court may have failed to apply its own rule correctly, instead 
creating different rules to apply for law enforcement and average citizens.  
1. The Carloss Rule: Muddying the Waters 
In Carloss, the Tenth Circuit took a creative approach to deciding the 
case: instead of relying on a bright-line rule as had been standard in past 
Group 1 cases,
149
 the Carloss court adopted a flexible standard, allowing for 
more case-by-case, ad hoc adjudication. This rule, premised on an objective 
observer’s perception, rejects a categorical formulation in dealing with “No 
Trespassing” signs and the implied license to approach. 
Whether eschewing a bright-line rule in favor of a more flexible standard 
is wise is a source for debate, however. Indeed, the Oliver Court seemed to 
favor a categorical approach (at least in the context of open fields), stating 
that “a case-by-case approach [would not] provide a workable 
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.”150 This is because the “lawfulness of 
a search would turn on ‘[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all 
sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and 
hairline distinctions’” and “[t]he ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult 
for the policeman to discern the scope of his authority; it also creates a 
danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably 
enforced.”151 The same analysis used by the Oliver Court can likewise 
apply to Carloss—the Tenth Circuit’s flexible, context-based standard 
leaves wide room for interpretation, potentially further confusing the 
already murky Fourth Amendment protections offered to the home.  
But, while a case-by-case approach has its drawbacks, it also offers some 
benefits, namely, the same flexibility that has the potential to create 
difficulties for law enforcement also encourages a fresh and individualized 
examination of each case before the court. For example, while one house 
may only have a small “No Trespassing” sign near the driveway, another 
house, like the one in Carloss, may have multiple signs clearly visible to 
any observer. A categorical approach would treat both of these houses the 
same; a case-by-case approach, on the other hand, would examine each case 
                                                                                                                 
 149. As a reminder, Group 1 cases are cases involving only “No Trespassing” signs, as 
opposed to Group 2 cases, in which “No Trespassing” signs plus other privacy measures 
were present.  
 150. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).  
 151. Id. at 181-82 (citation omitted).  
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independently on its facts to determine if the homeowner had sufficiently 
relayed his or her expectation of privacy, thereby revoking the implied 
license. While such an approach may make it difficult for law enforcement 
to decipher privacy rights on the fly, it also acknowledges the practical 
reality that most situations implicating Fourth Amendment rights are 
different and factually unique.  
Regardless of the merits of a categorical or case-by-case approach, a 
potentially larger problem exists with Carloss’s new rule: taken together 
with past case law, the Tenth Circuit has cast uncertainty on the status of 
prior Group 1 cases. Using past cases as a guide, Fourth Amendment cases 
involving “No Trespassing” signs have generally been examined under the 
following framework. Cases are first divided into Group 1 or Group 2; for 
Group 1 cases, a bright-line rule exists, stating that either “No Trespassing” 
signs revoke or do not revoke the implied license.
152
 For Group 2, a case-
by-case approach has be used, and the Dunn test has often been the starting 
point to differentiate “No Trespassing” signs on protected curtilage (and 
often revoking the implied license) from signs in unprotected open fields. 
The benefits of such a framework should be apparent: easier Group 1 cases 
are dispensed with by a bright-line rule, while the more difficult Group 2 
cases are left to a more nuanced and complex analysis. And, years of prior 
case law remain in play to provide helpful guideposts for future decisions.  
However, the Tenth Circuit may have recognized the problem with a 
simple bright-line rule for Group 1 cases. Namely, what happens when “No 
Trespassing” signs exist both in open fields and on protected curtilage, as 
was the case in Carloss? Cases in which “No Trespassing” signs exist only 
in open fields should be straightforward—under Oliver, no constitutional 
protection will be afforded the open field, and therefore no revocation of 
the implied license would occur. The more difficult question of how to 
address “No Trespassing” signs on the curtilage, however, remains in play. 
Courts could, as the Hopper court seemed to do, grant an unfettered license 
to approach the home, even in the presence of enhanced privacy measures, 
such as “No Trespassing” signs, designed to revoke that very license. 
However, as Judge Gorsuch pointed out in his dissent, this could be 
difficult for the average citizen to accept: “[Y]ou can't help but wonder if 
millions of homeowners . . . might be surprised to learn that even a long 
line of clearly posted No Trespassing signs are insufficient to revoke the 
                                                                                                                 
 152. This bright-line rule can, and should, make use of the Dunn test, as was done in 
Hopper, by stating that “No Trespassing” signs alone do (or do not) create a constitutionally 
protected curtilage zone.  
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implied license to enter a home's curtilage—that No Trespassing signs have 
become little more than lawn art.”153 
Instead, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a pragmatic, context-based rule, 
potentially to address these very complexities. As its rule states, revocation 
of the implied license hinges on whether an “objective officer, or member 
of the public” would believe the license had been revoked, given “the 
context in which . . . [they] encountered the signs and the message that 
those signs would have conveyed.”154 While this rule works in the context 
of Group 2 cases, such a rule could easily incorporate the Dunn test within 
its framework; doing so may more accurately reflect the complexities of 
these cases. However, the Tenth Circuit’s rule might relegate Group 1 cases 
to the status of unpersuasive precedent at best, meaning cases that in the 
past fit comfortably within Group 1 no longer have much case law upon 
which to rely.  
The Tenth Circuit tacitly acknowledged this: the court rejected Carloss’s 
argument that “No Trespassing” signs have “the talismanic quality” of 
revoking the implied license, citing to several post-Jardines cases, while 
also asserting that “Carloss has not cited, nor can we find, any post-
Jardines authority holding that a resident can revoke the implied license . . . 
simply by posting a ‘No Trespassing’ sign.”155 It seems, therefore, that the 
Tenth Circuit has signaled that the authority of pre-Jardines “No 
Trespassing” sign cases may no longer carry much weight, further 
complicating the already-muddied waters created by its new rule. Future 
cases will most likely need to clarify this position.  
2. Did the Tenth Circuit Fail to Correctly Apply Its Own Rule? 
On its face, the Tenth Circuit’s decision appears to be sound: the “No 
Trespassing” signs in the front and side yards are in unprotected open 
fields, rendering them ineffective, and the sign on the front door (part of the 
protected curtilage) was ambiguous because it included additional language 
that confused its message to an objective observer. However, one major 
problem exists with this ruling. Namely, the Tenth Circuit considered the 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 154. Id. at 994 (majority opinion).  
 155. Id. at 995. While this statement is true on its face, the problem with its rationale is 
that Jardines did not radically alter Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; instead, more than 
anything it formalized law that the lower courts had already been using for years. Several 
cases, including some that have already been cited, do hold that “No Trespassing” signs can 
revoke the implied license. While the number of these cases is small, it seems disingenuous 
to draw a hard cutoff line at Jardines when Jardines did not fundamentally alter the law.  
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“No Trespassing” signs independently of each other, failing to consider the 
message the signs conveyed as a whole.  
In its ruling, the court separated and treated independently the different 
“No Trespassing” signs: the signs in the “open fields” of the front and side 
yards, and the sign on the front door.
156
 But the court’s own rule draws no 
such distinction, relying solely on how a member of the public who 
encounters those signs in context would perceive them, and what message 
the signs would convey to an objective officer or member of the public 
under the circumstances.
157
 Even the concurrence indicated that context and 
circumstances are important—while noting that “nothing aside from their 
numerosity makes the ‘No Trespassing’ signs . . . particularly distinctive,” 
Chief Judge Tymkovich acknowledged that “context matters.”158  
The problem with this line of logic, and the similar logic offered in the 
majority opinion, is that numerosity and placement of “No Trespassing” 
signs are part of the context in which an objective observer would view the 
signs. In this case, four signs were posted on the property, two of which 
were near the driveway, one in the side yard, and one on the front door of 
the home.
159
 A person approaching the home would not view the signs 
independently of each other, nor would they fail to understand the clear 
intentions of a homeowner who posts four separate “No Trespassing” signs 
on his property, three of which would be viewed by anyone approaching the 
home via the driveway.
160
 As Judge Gorsuch’s dissent pointed out, “We do 
seem to invite quite a paradox when we suggest the first three signs are 
irrelevant to curtilage because they were not posted on curtilage and yet 
treat the final sign as irrelevant to curtilage even though it was.”161 Viewed 
in context and under the circumstances, the message conveyed by the 
multiple signs, regardless of their location in the “open fields” of the front 
and side yards or in the home’s front porch curtilage, seems to be clear: 
uninvited visitors are not welcome.
162
 On this basis, a case could be made 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See id. at 995-97.  
 157. Id. at 994.  
 158. Id. at 1000 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).  
 159. Id. at 990 (majority opinion).  
 160. Curiously, the officers in Carloss approached the house via the driveway and yet 
claimed to not remembering seeing the “No Trespassing” signs. Id. This claim by the 
officers is dubious at best—the trial court found the signs were there on the day in question 
and the government did not contest the point on appeal. Id.  
 161. Id. at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 162. In its decision, the Tenth Circuit takes pains to draw no distinction between 
members of the public and law enforcement. See, e.g., id. at 994 (majority opinion) 
(“Whether that is so depends on the context in which a member of the public, or an officer 
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that the Tenth Circuit failed to apply its own rule correctly to Carloss’s 
case.  
B. The Court’s Lingering Analysis: A Missed Opportunity 
As stated previously, almost no case law exists on the “lingering” 
argument offered by Carloss, and the Tenth Circuit’s discussion and 
analysis of this issue is threadbare at best, amounting to one single 
paragraph of text. This seems to be a missed opportunity for the court to 
shape the discussion around an emerging issue of law. As the Jardines rule 
stated, “Th[e] implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the 
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and 
then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”163  
The rule therefore can be divided into two parts: the “approach” prong 
and the “linger” prong. The approach prong has a wealth of prior case law 
discussing its scope, and seems to be the more straightforward prong: an 
implied license exists to approach the home, up to and until that license is 
revoked.
164
 The linger prong, on the other hand, has comparably little 
relevant case law, and appears to operate much more in the gray. For 
example, one examining the linger prong may ask: How long can one stay 
on another’s front porch before the license is exceeded? Does time of day 
matter? Should the intent of the visitor (peaceful, confrontational, etc.) 
affect the timeframe? How do noises or responses coming from inside the 
home alter the analysis? Should the presence of an urgent matter impact the 
                                                                                                                 
seeking to conduct a knock-and-talk, encountered the signs . . . .”); id. at 995 (“As an initial 
matter, just the presence of a ‘No Trespassing’ sign is not alone sufficient to convey to an 
objective officer, or member of the public, that he cannot go to the front door and knock.”); 
id. at 996 (“But that sign was ambiguous and did not clearly revoke the implied license 
extended to members of the public, including police officers, to enter the home’s 
curtilage . . . .”); id. at 997 (“The message here does not clearly and unambiguously tell the 
mail carrier, pizza deliverer, or police officer that they cannot knock on the front door 
seeking a consensual conversation with those who live there.”). However, a case can be 
made that, while a reasonable member of the public would view the signs as revoking the 
implied license, law enforcement officers may view the signs differently, especially 
considering their job duties and in acknowledgement that both common law and statutory 
trespass rules generally do not apply to officers with regard to open fields. Id. at 996. 
Viewed in this light, it begs the question of whether different rules should, or already do, in 
fact exist for the police.  
 163. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).  
 164. While there is certainly more at play here (as the preceding case law and discussion 
should make abundantly clear), it is true that intuitively most members of society know that 
they can approach the front door of neighbor, unless or until that neighbor tells them to “get 
lost.” Jardines, King, and Davis base their holding on this very principle.  
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formulation? Unfortunately, the court largely leaves these questions 
unanswered. While it does seem raise a few of these potential questions,
165
 
it offers no analytical framework for how to answer them. 
C. Workable Solutions 
1. Shaping Carloss’s Revocation Analysis 
As noted, the Carloss rule for the revocation analysis is a fairly novel 
attempt to solve the dilemma over whether “No Trespassing” signs revoke 
law enforcement’s implied license to conduct knock and talks. While the 
flexible, case-by-case approach creates some problems, the largest of which 
is the difficulty for law enforcement to make on-the-spot decisions, this 
approach is likely still superior to a categorical, bright-line rule, because it 
acknowledges the obvious: individual cases require individual treatment 
and cannot always be fitted into simple, one-size-fits-all groups. However, 
because there is very little case law that uses a context-based approach,
166
 
the Tenth Circuit should take steps to clarify and shape the Carloss rule, for 
the sake of lower courts, members of the public who wish to preserve their 
privacy, and, ultimately, for law enforcement.  
As the dissent suggests, the majority “strongly impl[ies] that No 
Trespassing signs will do their job as long as they (1) are placed visibly on 
the curtilage itself and (2) don’t contain surplus language about hunting and 
trapping.”167 Although this may prove to be a rather narrow needle to thread 
(thereby inviting “a new chapter of cases forced to make fine judgments 
about the placement and contents of signs”168), it does offer some 
parameters for how “No Trespassing” signs could revoke the implied 
license. As such, the Tenth Circuit should strive to enumerate more 
precisely the standard for how revocation might properly occur. 
It appears that one such way would be placement of an unambiguous 
“No Trespassing” sign on a home’s curtilage.169 Under such a scenario, 
however, defining and distinguishing what property is considered curtilage 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See Carloss, 818 F.3d at 998 (declining to “place a specific time limit on how long a 
person can knock” and noting that the officers “were no doubt encouraged to remain a bit 
longer . . . because they heard movement inside the house” and that there was “no suggestion 
that the officers knocked aggressively or demanded entry”).  
 166. As mentioned previously, the Tenth Circuit only cites two state court cases, one out 
of Tennessee and one out of Idaho, in support of its context-based rule. Id. at 994-95.  
 167. Id. at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 168. Id.  
 169. As illustrated in the analysis of Group 2 cases, other courts have already reached 
this conclusion.  
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becomes a paramount concern. Here, the Dunn test provides an excellent 
guide for courts to distinguish between open fields and the home’s 
curtilage. As in Carloss, using the four factors of the test
170
 generally 
suggests that unenclosed front and side yards be treated as unprotected open 
fields—at least, under the Tenth Circuit’s precedent.171 Although this 
creates other problems, namely that it could lead courts to look at signs 
independently of each other (as the Tenth Circuit did in Carloss) instead of 
in total (as the language of the Carloss rule would suggest), the rule at least 
helps to provide a demarcation for when a “No Trespassing” sign 
adequately revokes the implied license.  
The Carloss decision also made clear that the language of any “No 
Trespassing” sign should be unambiguous. Although the dissent cast doubt 
on the majority’s assertion that the sign on Carloss’s front door was 
ambiguous,
172
 the majority made clear that the sign’s ambiguity prevented it 
from revoking the implied license. However, other signs could offer the 
same gist as Carloss’s without using the same words: “Keep Off”; “No 
Solicitation”; “Do Not Enter”; “Uninvited Visitors Not Welcome”; or, as 
the dissent flippantly offered: “THE IMPLIED LICENSE DISCUSSED BY 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN BREARD V. 
ALEXANDRIA, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) AND FLORIDA V. JARDINES, 133 S. 
CT. 1409, 185 L. ED. 2D 495 (2013) IS HEREBY REVOKED.”173 While 
this last example is very clearly meant to be unambiguous, it seems 
probable that most people unfamiliar with legal technicalities would have 
no idea what an “implied license” is, and certainly would not know what 
those Supreme Court cases discussed. If a large majority of society 
undoubtedly would not understand even Judge Gorsuch’s sign, is that sign 
also therefore ambiguous? Likewise, every other example provided above 
offers at least some level of ambiguity. As it stands now, it is unclear 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See supra note 94.  
 171. See Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
the front yard of a duplex was not part of the home’s curtilage); United States v. Cousins, 
455 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the side yard of a home was not part 
of the home’s curtilage).  
 172. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1013-14 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
I would have thought it equally (or maybe even a good deal more) likely that a reasonable 
person—considering whether to enter a stranger’s front porch and staring at a large 
‘PRIVATE PROPERTY’ sign forbidding ‘TRESPASSING FOR ANY PURPOSE’—would 
take it as directed at him and his activities rather than as directed only at someone interested 
in hunting or fishing somewhere else on the property. 
Id.  
 173. Id. at 1012.  
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whether any of these signs, or even a simple “No Trespassing” sign without 
extra language, would be clear enough to revoke the implied license. 
Therefore, in future decisions, the Tenth Circuit should offer some 
guidelines as to what language would be clear enough for a neutral, 
objective observer. 
2. A Framework for Future Linger Analysis 
Because the court gave such little treatment to it, the linger prong of the 
Jardines rule remains largely undefined and unresolved. However, Carloss, 
J.K., and other knock and talk decisions offer some clues as to how a linger 
prong framework could look.  
For starters, any framework should be rooted in the Katz test: whether “a 
person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”174 This starting point is important for two reasons: first, the 
Katz test has provided the foundation for Fourth Amendment analysis for 
fifty years; and second, the Katz test incorporates societal norms into its 
second prong—and past cases have shown that societal norms serve as the 
backbone of the implied license.  
From there, several relevant factors can be drawn from cases to 
determine whether the implied license has been exceeded by lingering too 
long: length of time,
175
 time of day,
176
 officer conduct,
177
 indications that 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 175. See J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 232-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that the “length 
of time the officers remained [at the house] would alone constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment”); cf. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 998 (declining to “place a specific time limit on how 
long a person can knock before exceeding the scope of [the] implied license”).  
 176. See Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting the right 
“for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front 
door of any man's ‘castle’ with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof” 
and that “[t]he time of day . . . rule[d] out the possible dangers to [the residents] which might 
have resulted from a similar unannounced call in the dead of night”) (emphasis added); J.K., 
8 N.E.3d at 232 (finding that the “officers’ conduct . . . went far beyond anything that would 
ordinarily be expected to occur on one’s doorstep” in part because the encounter occurred 
around 1:00 a.m.). 
 177. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (“To find a visitor knocking on the 
door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor exploring the front 
path with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden . . . would inspire 
most of us to—well, call the police.”); Carloss, 818 F.3d at 998 (“There is no suggestion that 
the officers knocked aggressively or demanded entry.”); J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 232 (“If three men 
with guns and flashlights were to surround the average person’s home in the wee hours of 
the morning . . . and yell inside demanding the occupants open the door, this situation 
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the resident is home,
178
 and whether pressing or urgent circumstances 
exist.
179
 From these potential factors, a rule could be formulated to provide 
guidance for courts to examine the linger prong of the Jardines rule. This 
rule might tentatively be stated as follows: “Whether a law enforcement 
official has exceeded the implied license to approach a home to conduct a 
‘knock and talk’ by lingering within the home’s protected curtilage for too 
long is determined by considering: (1) the length of time the officers spent 
within the protected curtilage; (2) the time of day at which the attempted 
‘knock and talk’ occurred; (3) the conduct and actions of the officers during 
the attempted ‘knock and talk;’ (4) the presence of any indication, or lack 
thereof, that the resident was home at the time of the attempted ‘knock and 
talk;’ and (5) whether pressing or urgent circumstances existed.” While this 
rule is neither perfect nor all-inclusive, and while courts might consider 
other factors not listed here, such a rule could potentially work as a useful 
tool for evaluating issues raised under the linger prong of Jardines.  
VI. Conclusion 
Without a doubt, the interplay between the Fourth Amendment, the 
implied license to conduct a knock and talk, “No Trespassing” signs, and 
                                                                                                                 
would . . . inspire the homeowner to call the police.”); cf. United States v. Quintero, 648 
F.3d 660, 670 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that a “coercive atmosphere . . . coupled with the 
officers' misrepresentations,” demonstrated that consent to enter the defendant’s home was 
involuntary).  
 178. See Carloss, 818 F.3d at 998 (“The officers were no doubt encouraged to remain a 
bit longer . . . because they heard movement inside the house . . . .”); cf. Kentucky v. King, 
563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011) (“When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not 
to respond or to speak, ‘the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low point . . . .’). 
 179. Generally, “exigent circumstances” provide law enforcement officers with great 
leeway upon which to investigate crimes and/or enter the home without a warrant. See, e.g., 
Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1002 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting that “police can always enter 
a home if an emergency or other exigent circumstance has provided sufficient justification to 
enter”); cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (“Absent some grave 
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the 
police.”). However, to be clear, the use of “pressing or urgent” circumstances as a potential 
factor to consider in any linger analysis, as it is used in this Note, signifies some level below 
“exigency” or “emergency,” due to the broad leeway courts grant under the guise of 
“exigencies” and the significant case law surrounding such circumstances. That being said, 
the presence of “pressing or urgent” circumstances seems to be a reasonable factor to 
consider. For example, if the barn of one’s neighbor was on fire, it seems eminently 
reasonable that a person could linger on that neighbor’s front porch beyond what would 
normally be deemed socially acceptable, if only to notify the neighbor of the “urgent” 
situation.  
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how long a police officer can linger on a front porch represents a complex 
and developing area of law. However, as past cases show, any decision 
concerning these issues, especially under the guise of the knock and talk, 
must be grounded in an understanding of societal norms. United States v. 
Carloss embodies all of these complexities and tensions. The Tenth Circuit, 
in deciding the daunting issue of whether the “No Trespassing” signs 
revoked the implied license, chose a fairly novel approach, eschewing past 
court decisions in favor of a case-by-case, context-based approach. 
However, this approach has at least two major problems. First, the court 
further muddied the already-confusing waters surrounding “No 
Trespassing” signs and the implied license, without providing any guidance 
for future cases. And second, the court failed to correctly apply its own rule, 
by looking at the “No Trespassing” signs as two independent groups instead 
of in totality. Lastly, the court declined to provide a framework to address 
future “lingering” issues, offering instead only a bare-bones, conclusory 
explanation for its decision.  
Other knock and talk (and Fourth Amendment) cases, however, can 
provide helpful guides on how to interpret and expand on the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision moving forward. In particular, the linger issue provides 
an opportunity for courts to explore the boundaries set by the Supreme 
Court in Florida v. Jardines, and in particular, what extent of police 
intrusion into a home’s curtilage is societally acceptable. But, until such 
issues are addressed, United States v. Carloss will need to be looked at for 
what it is: a flawed decision in which the Tenth Circuit failed to 
satisfactorily resolve whether law enforcement, like the rest of society, are 
required to be “good neighbors.” 
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